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BOOK NOTICE
Rationalizing Juvenile Justice
Carolyn J. Frantz*

By Franklin E. Zimring. New York:
Oxford University Press. 1998. Pp. xiii, 209. $29.95.

AMERICAN YOUTH VIOLENCE.

Few issues have occupied the public mind so much in recent years
as the problem of youth violence. Due to sensational school shootings
and public paranoia about the violence of youth gangs, America is
concerned - very concerned - about the growing criminality of its
children. In our concern, we find ourselves caught in the classic co
nundrum of criminal responsibility: reconciling the unavoidable
knowledge that much of human behavior is determined with our
strong instincts about free will. We blame violent television and video
games, we blame single mothers, we blame low church attendance, but
when all is said and done, we punish the child. The concrete response
to our fears about increasing youth violence has been increased ac
countability for young offenders, and growing rhetoric about the
genuine evil that exists even in seemingly innocent youth.
Franklin Zimring1 confronts this trend of "getting tough" on young
offenders in his most recent book, American Youth Violence. The ba
sic aim of his project is to quell the storm of youth crime policy moti
vated by "fear and hostility" towards young offenders (p. xiii). In
creased length of punishment, as well as abandonment of efforts at
reform, have characterized the recent moves in juvenile justice.
Zimring argues against these trends.
Zimring approaches the problem of youth criminality in a re
markably comprehensive manner. He comes at the issues from all an
gles - he is at the same time a social scientist, a policy specialist, and a
legal philosopher. He uses empirical data to challenge (quite con
vincingly) the perception that American youth are increasingly violent
(pp. 31-47). He uses his empirical findings to suggest reforms, such as
changes in firearms policy, that would be likely to make a difference in
the degree of violence among young people (pp. 89-106). Most im* Thanks to Thomas Green and Abigail Carter for careful reading of drafts and invalu
able discussion.

1. William G. Simon Professor of Law and Director of the Earl Warren Legal Institute,
University of California at Berkeley.
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pressively, Zimring ties all of this together with deep legal and social
debates about youth criminal responsibility. He not only tells us what
the data say, but what they mean.
This impressive integration of views leads Zimring to a unified per
spective on American youth violence that is rational and coherent.
His main critique of existing means of dealing with youth violence is
that they are illogical. He argues, for instance, that if a certain large
percentage of youth who commit isolated violent acts never repeat
them in adulthood, then violence is, by and large, "kid stuff" (p. 84).
For Zimring it is silly and counterproductive to follow recent trends
and put these kids in jail for some extended time, impeding their nor
mal development, and it is wrongheaded to brand them as evil crimi
nal predators (pp. 81-85). Zimring also seeks rational consistency be
tween youth crime policy and other policies concerning youth. He
suggests, for example, that our views of the risk of youth crime ought
to be in some way informed by our views of the risks of youth driving.
If society is willing to bear some risk to public safety in order to allow
young people to develop into less risky adult drivers, perhaps it ought
to be willing to tolerate the same degree of youth criminality as part of
normal youth development (pp. 85-86). Similarly, he analogizes laws
relating to alcohol to youth criminal responsibility if the trend is to
raise the age of legal possession of alcohol, he asks, how can this be
consistent with lowering the age of criminal responsibility for commis
sion of crimes (p. 81)?
Zimring's drive towards logic and coherence in social responses to
youth violence is admirable and compelling (p. 127). But it raises the
question whether approaches to criminality can ever be rational in the
way that Zimring hopes. As this Notice will show, the criminal justice
system serves an important role in affirming the reality of free will and
personal responsibility in society, a role that often conflicts with en
lightened viewpoints about acceptable risks and social scientific un
derstandings. What appear to Zimring to be incoherencies are actu
ally crucial strategies for holding the line on personal responsibility in
the face of nagging awareness of the degrees to which human behavior
is determined.2 This tension between free will and determinism leads
to a constant negotiation between holding responsibility and denying
it, the ultimate settlement of which is anything but neatly consistent.3
-

2 See generally Barry C. Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court: Youthfulness, Criminal Re
sponsibility, and Sentencing Policy, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 68 (1997); Thomas A.
Green, Freedom and Criminal Responsibility in the Age of Pound: An Essay on Criminal
Justice, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1915 (1995) [hereinafter Green I].
3. Some deny the existence of any logical contradiction within the criminal law on the
issue of criminal responsibility. For instance, Michael Moore has explained away the prob
lem by taking a staunchly deterministic stance and describing most of the seemingly "free
will"-based criminal law as based on practical (utilitarian) considerations about deterrability.
See Michael S. Moore, Causation and the Excuses, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1091 (1985). But most
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By placing free will and determinism at the center of debates about
criminal justice, this Notice follows upon the conceptual frame set out
by Thomas A. Green in his historical examinations of criminal justice
at the beginning of this century.4 Green has pointed to some of the
ways in which the major structures of criminal law during this era can
be explained by the tension between the two views of criminal respon
sibility. This Notice aims to show that this tension must also be ad
dressed when suggesting criminal justice reforms today.5 Zimring has
failed to listen to the lessons of history - particularly the Progressive
Era, when similar attempts to rationalize the criminal justice system
failed.6 Zimring must deal with the debates about criminal responsi
bility that caused this failure if he wishes his contemporary reforms to
succeed.

I.

THE "COMING STORM"

Zimring begins his book by highlighting the logical inconsistencies
that can be caused by the debate between free will and determinism.7
He notes the popularity of fears about a "coming storm" of "juvenile
super-predators," hardened young criminals.8 The fears are based on
demographics - assumptions that certain social conditions uniformly
produce these kinds of offenders. If we really believe this, Zimring
argues, why should our response to the coming storm be an increasing
call for treating juveniles harshly, as if they had free will? "[A]rguing
that the later course of criminal careers can be predicted long in ad-

people understand criminal responsibility to reflect genuine moral condemnation based on
the reality of free will. The general perception of a tension between the two stances at the
very least affects behavior and policy in these areas.
4. See Green I, supra note 2, at 2043-53. Green is in the process of bringing his investi
gations forward through the Progressive Era and into the present. See Thomas A. Green,
Conventional Morality, Positivism, and the Rule of Law: Perspectives on Freedom and
Criminal Responsibility in Mid-Twentieth Century America {1930·1960) {Feb. 1, 2000) (un
published manuscript, on file with author) [hereinafter Green II]. In dealing with juvenile
justice, this Notice addresses issues that Green has not fully investigated. Thus, my sugges
tions for how to proceed in this area are my own.
5. I have benefited from discussions with Green about criminal justice in the post-1960s
period.

6. See DAVID J. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM AND ITS
ALTERNATIVES IN PROGRESSIVE AMERICA 61 {1980) {describing the "logical" thrust of
Progressive reform).
7. Precise definitions for "free will" and "determinism" are hard to come by, and have
occupied libraries of philosophical literature. For the purposes of this Notice, the reader
should rely on her instincts, however vague and unsatisfying, about this conceptual distinc
tion.

8. Pp. 4-5 (quoting Bill McCollum, April 30, 1996. Testimony Before the House Sub
committee on Early Childhood, Youth, and Families. Washington, D.C. U.S. Government
Printing Office).
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vance seems inconsistent with doctrines of free will and moral ac
countability, which are important to the case for adult punishment and
responsibility" (p. 11). To Zimring, whatever degrees of determina
tion are reflected in statistics should be compatible with the degree of
responsibility assigned to criminals at trial.
Zimring's logical move assumes that the role social scientists play
in society is identical to that of criminal courts. If deterministic in
sights are accepted within social science, they should also be accepted
in the criminal justice system. But there is a difference. Society has
strong reasons for wishing to maintain a criminal justice system whose
primary philosophy is that of free will, a need that does not extend to
social science. It is because of their special role as fora for social af
firmation of personal responsibility that courts are required to reflect
a belief in free will not necessarily borne out by the social scientific
data.
This need became apparent during the Progressive Era. Positivis
tic social scientists and jurists attempted to model all of criminal jus
tice to reflect a deterministic vision.9 Despite relatively widespread
belief in the scientific truth of these thinkers' viewpoint, Progressive
society found itself reluctant to incorporate those insights into the
functioning of criminal courts. This positivist agenda was instead met
by fear that bringing such a deterministic perspective into the court
system would lead to a wide-scale loss of personal responsibility ac
companied by an increase in criminality,10 as well as a lessening of the
psychic 1 1 and spiritual 12 health of individual citizens. It was not healthy
for a society to focus on the excuses that everyone undoubtedly has
for wrongdoing. If society did not retain a focus on free will, it was
thought, citizens would not feel an obligation to escape the bounds of

9. During the Progressive Era, the early part of the 20th century, there were significant
changes in the way criminality was conceptualized. Reformers influenced by largely deter
ministic social science and psychology (here referred to as "positivists") "were convinced
that they understood the complex causes of crime and were capable of designing a program
to eradicate it." ROTHMAN, supra note 6, at 45. These reformers reconceptualized the pur
poses of the criminal system to be treatment rather than punishment, and attempted (with
only limited degrees of success) to shape the law and criminal justice institutions to reflect
this view. See generally id. As a strategy for succeeding in the midst of strong popular sup
port for free will-based views of criminality, Progressive jurists tended to focus on reforming
the institutions of penology, while conceding much of guilt assessment to the traditional
view. See Green I, supra note 2, at 1918, 1925-26.
10. See Green II, supra note 4, at 145, 150.
11. See Robert P. Knight, Determinism, "Freedom," and Psychotherapy, 9 PSYCHIATRY
251, 259 (1946), discussed in Green II, supra note 4, at 142-45.
12 See Green II, supra
REsPONSIBILITY (1951)).

note 4, at 145-50 (discussing SIR WALTER MOBERLY,
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their own circumstances. Treating people who did not have real
choice "as jf" they did was good for them and good for everyone else.13
This fear of encroaching determinism in the criminal justice system
persists (in fact thrives) today. The popularity of books such as James
Q. Wilson's Moral Judgment (subtitled, appropriately, Does the Abuse
Excuse Threaten Our Legal System? ) is testimony. Many believe that
"a sense of personal responsibility . .. has withered " in the presence of
legal excuses that recognize the possibly determined nature of some
adult criminal behavior.14 Allow evidence of battered women's syn
drome and temporary insanity, and what you end up with is the
"Twinkie defense. "15 No one could put the response to the Progres
sive positivists in better modern language than Wilson:

We are all exposed to temptations, we all on occasion lack self-control;
some of us face acute temptations or are remarkably deficient in self
control. It is the task of the law to raise, not lower, the ante in these cir
cumstances. . .. [I]t is the task of the law not only to remind us of what is
wrong . .. but also to remind us that we must work hard to conform to
the law.61
Fears of what might happen if the law abandons its commitment to
free will in the criminal justice system, remain compelling in the mod
ern context.
Thus, the justice system must, in some way, preserve the free will
based viewpoint that allows certain offenders to be labeled "juvenile
super-predators." While the criminal justice system is there to fulfill
the social function of affirming free will, Zimring and other social sci
entists are free to probe the truth of determinism. When social scien
tists are carrying out empirical work on potential criminality, their
findings are intellectual, largely reserved for specialists in the field.
The social need to affirm free will through such findings is not par
ticularly strong. It is primarily the court that speaks to the public. 17
The phenomenon is not limited to scientific predictions about ju
venile criminality. Lots of research is done every year predicting the

13. See generally Wilber
(1953).

G. Katz, Responsibility and Freedom, 5 J. LEGAL EDUC. 269

14. JAMES Q. WILSON, MORALJUDGMENT 1 (1997).
15. The public obsession with this defense arose from a case where the defendant's ex
pert witness, attempting to make the case for diminished responsibility, included his con
sumption ofjunk food as an element of his psychological state. See id. at 2, 22-23, 48-58.
16. Id. at 27-28.
17. For instance, by participating injuries, lay people are invited to listen to the message
sent by the criminal justice system, as well as to communicate with the broader public. This
discussion is frequently about personal responsibility. See generally Sherman J. Clark, The
Courage of Our Convictions, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2381 (1999).
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criminality of adults based on poverty or other social circumstances.18
Yet these studies have not formed the basis for changing the adult
courts to reflect a lessor degree of criminal responsibility. A distinc
tion between the sorts of conclusions that are allowed in scientific
journals and in the courtroom reflects the unique role courts play in
affirming free will in the face of scientific skepticism.
A similar response applies to Zimring's attempts to make youth
criminal justice consistent with other areas of youth policy, such as
driving policy, and access to alcohol.19 In a sense, Zimring is right.
Society tolerates a certain amount of risk in order to enable young
people to grow into responsible drivers, no doubt more risk than it
tolerates in order to allow young people to pass through stages of
criminality. He is also right about alcohol policy. Raising the age for
legal consumption of alcohol does in some way reflect a vision of
youth irresponsibility that is in tension with the trend towards lower
ing the age of criminal responsibility. The answer to these incoheren
cies, however, is an easy one. Driving policy and alcohol policy have
not taken on so central a role in the social fight to maintain a sense of
individual responsibility as has the criminal justice system.20 Few have
fears like Wilson's about the effect the message sent by raising the
driving age will have on the social fabric. Criminal justice policy, by
contrast, is where free will is affirmed. Its message on the matter of
responsibility is broadcast loudly throughout the culture. The risk
posed by youth criminality is different in kind from the risk posed by
youth driving. It poses a challenge to basic social understandings of
individual responsibility that cannot be ignored.

II.

THE JUVENILE COURT

For most of the rest of the book, Zimring turns his logical eye to
examining the way criminal responsibility is attributed to young of
fenders. Section II.A sets out Zimring's plan for reform of this system.
One of its most remarkable features is Zimring's rejection of the juve
nile court as a conceptually separate criminal justice system that al
lows a more deterministic view of the offenders within it. Instead,
Zimring proposes a unified adult/juvenile court philosophy that some
how manages to retain a focus on free will while accommodating the
deterministic insights of social science. Section II.B issues a caution to

18. See generally Irene Merker Rosenberg et al., Return of the Stubborn and Rebellious
Son: An Independent Sequel on the Prediction of Future Criminality, 37 BRANDEIS LJ. 511

(1998) .

19. See supra pp. 1975-77.
20. For a discussion of criminal responsibility as the stage upon which basic issues of
free will and determinism are perpetually played out, see Green I, supra note 2, at 1915-17,
1925.

1980

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 98:1974

Zimring's project. It suggests that because of the need to preserve a
safe space for free will condemnation of criminal behavior, the main
adult criminal justice system cannot accommodate as much determin
ism as Zimring recommends. Section II.C provides historical perspec
tive by identifying attempts to incorporate determinism into adult
criminal justice in the Progressive Era and beyond that have failed for
precisely this reason. Section II.D demonstrates that the present allo
cation of offenders into the juvenile and adult systems is actually logi
cal when viewed in relation to these features of criminal justice.
A.

Rational Reform

Zimring's recommendations for dealing with young offenders sug
gest a view of youth criminality that is primarily deterministic.
Zimring focuses on the way particular features of youth lessen juvenile
offenders' blameworthiness for crimes they commit (pp. 76-81).
Linked to his skepticism about the responsibility of young offenders
for their crimes are his recommendations about proper punishment.
Young offenders, influenced as they are by their immaturity and by
particular social circumstances, have "room to reform." Thus, they
also have strong claims to reform-based rather than purely retributive
punishment (pp. 142-43). According to Zimring, "the response of the
criminal justice system to adolescent violence can only be coherent" if
it reflects the lessened blameworthiness and the strong claims to re
form of young offenders (p. 127).
To make the system coherent, Zimring recommends individualiz
ing judgments of guilt and sentencing (p. 136). This theme runs
throughout his book, forming the basis for most of his arguments
about the proper approach to youth violence. There is no such thing
as a typical adolescent homicide, Zimring argues (pp. 134-37). Each
one is different, and courts must take individual circumstances into ac
count if they want to be "coherent in making retributive judgments"
(p. 132). Generalizing about any sort of violent youth offenders, he
claims, is unwise given the wide distribution of characteristics (p. 163).
Looking at each young offender's individual circumstances, and tai
loring the response to match her degree of responsibility and her pos
sibilities for reform, is the rational response to such divergence.
Adopting such an individualized system, according to Zimring,
should not be too difficult for our criminal justice system. It flows
naturally from the principle of penal proportionality, he claims, that
the punishment should fit the degree of responsibility of the individual
offender. Zimring claims that this principle is already inherent as one
of the central ideals of the entire criminal justice system, including the
adult system (pp. 75-76). Adults should be held more or less culpable
for the crimes they commit, in accordance with the degree of freedom
they individually possess, and be punished accordingly. He does not
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discuss the extent to which that ideal has been realized in the present
system,21 but he is certain that this principle is, at the very least, a rec
ognized ideal to which the criminal justice system could (and should)
be held. For Zimring, all decisions of the criminal justice system, af
fecting juveniles and adults alike, should involve a sensitive individual
inquiry.
It is Zimring's belief that his ideal juvenile justice philosophy is al
ready implicit as the ideal for the adult system that causes him to give
up on keeping young offenders in the juvenile court, thus conceding
one of the main strategies for preserving a less punitive agenda for ju
veniles.22 For Zimring, preserving the jurisdiction of the juvenile court
is unnecessary. All that is necessary is making the adult court live up
to its own ideals. Even in adult court, Zimring claims, the special dis
advantages of the offenders' youth should be taken into account.
Adult court justice, like juvenile justice, ought to be sensitive to de
grees of individual culpability and the possibilities of reform through
sentencing.23 Thus, according to Zimring, it makes no difference
which court ends up with the young offender, so long as that court acts
in accordance with Zimring's general principles (pp.127-28).
For Zimring, the ideal jurisdictional division between the juvenile
and adult courts depends on whether the court is empowered to pro
vide the particular length of punishment that the individual young of
fender requires. A young offender ought to end up in adult court
when he should have a sentence that is greater than that which can be
levied by the juvenile court (p. 169). For Zimring, that decision is
again ultimately based on the rule of penal proportionality (and, by
extension, on the individual maturity and culpability of the offender)
(pp. 109, 127-28). Zimring thus envisions a seamless transition be
tween the offenders sent to juvenile court and those that end up in
adult court. In either court, an offender gets exactly what he deserves,
perfectly tailored to his individual responsibility. The decision to
waive a young offender into adult court becomes, in a way, no big
deal, nothing that needs to be probed in any more depth than the de
termination of the precise gradation of punishment deserved by an in
dividual offender.
21. For this Notice's discussion of this issue, see infra text accompanying notes 29-31.
22. Zimring is not the only scholar to adopt such a view. Many "progressive abolition
ists" recommend eliminating the juvenile court altogether and attempting to achieve the
goals of juvenile justice in adult court. See, e.g., Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Child
hood and Reconstructing the Legal Order: The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69
N.C. L. REV. 1083 (1991); Katherine Hunt Federle, The Abolition of the Juvenile Court: A
Proposal for the Preservation of Children's Legal Rights, 16 J. CONTEMP. L. 23 (1990); Barry
C. Feld, The Transformation ofthe Juvenile Court, 75 MINN. L. REV. 691 (1991).
23. See, e.g., p. 122 ("[A]n increased volume of juvenile homicides processed in adult
courts should reduce somewhat the average severity of the sanctions because more cases of
lesser seriousness would be in the adult court for sentencing.").
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Zimring glosses over what is typically considered the main differ
ence between the juvenile and the adult court systems - the farmer's
focus on reform and the latter's on retribution - by denying the exis
tence of serious conflict between the two priorities. In most cases,
Zimring claims, the two goals can be met simultaneously. According
to Zimring, the range of retributively appropriate sentences includes
the sentence that would best facilitate reform. The needs of reform
can be met, he suggests, by allowing judges to determine where, within
the morally mandated range, the sentence will fall (pp. 142-45). In in
stances when a young person deserves more punishment than his re
form requires, Zimring concedes that the minimum sentence necessary
to address the offender's blameworthiness must (regrettably) "carry
the day" (p. 143). But in an adult system where desert is tailored to
take account of every individual's special disabilities (including those
of youth), these unfortunate moments should be rare (p. 143).
For Zimring, the adult penal system can also provide the reform
efforts that young people need. Zimring argues that "whenever a
young offender's need for protection, education, and skill develop
ment can be accommodated without frustrating community security,
there is a government obligation to do so" (p. 144). Who could com
plain, Zimring suggests, if during the time they are paying their moral
debt, we give them treatment and reform rather than brutal hopeless
imprisonment (p.145)?
Thus, Zimring's reform efforts rely on the melding of the adult and
juvenile systems to reflect the same priorities. The adult system can
recognize the lessened responsibility of young offenders through the
principle of penal proportionality, and it can accommodate their spe
cial claims to reform without sacrificing its focus on retribution.
B.

Two Systems

Zimring would not be so sanguine about suggesting that juvenile
and adult courts could share the philosophy of individualized respon
sibility and the focus on reform if he took a hard look at the differ
ences between the two systems that have existed since the juvenile
court's inception, and persist today. Zimring neglects to consider the
forces that have made the adult system considerably less flexible and
reform-minded than the juvenile court. These differences exist for a
reason: society demands that the adult court, in order to fulfill its task
of reaffirming free will, keep a safe space for the holding of responsi
bility, free of the corrupting and encroaching influences of determinis
tic thinking. Insofar as Zimring's reform efforts require introducing
determinism into the mainstream adult system, their failure seems in
evitable.
Despite Zimring's attempts to create a seamless transition between
the two systems, major differences in philosophy remain. The juvenile
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court system recognizes individual lack of responsibility much more
readily than the adult court. By initial design, the juvenile court was
less of a criminal court and more of a social service agency. Because
those coming before it were not viewed as wholly responsible, reform
was its central goal, not retribution.24 This philosophy is still part of
the juvenile court, as evidenced by the fact that offenders in the juve
nile court system still lack some protections that are constitutionally
required in the adult system. The notion is that these protections are
not required when young offenders are not being condemned for their
acts, but rather helped to overcome the influence of external responsi
bility-compromising forces.25 Particularly in light of the movements to
"get tough" on juvenile offenders that Zimring identifies, the juvenile
court is moving further and further from that philosophy (pp. 13-16).
Correspondingly, an increasing number of constitutional protections
have been added to the juvenile court system.26 Some have even sug
gested that the juvenile court has gone so far afield from its non
criminal nature that young offenders would be better served if it were
abolished. If they are not going to be treated from a reform perspec
tive, the argument goes, they might at least get the procedural protec
tions the adult court has to offer.27 The very idea of the drift, however,
confirms that there is something basically different about the missions
of the juvenile and adult court systems. By and large, the idea that
youth are not fully responsible for their crimes still resonates with so
ciety.28 With all of its imperfections, the juvenile justice system does
retain a fair portion of the deterministic perspective with which it be
gan.
By contrast, the extent to which the free will philosophy reigns in
the adult court is underscored by the fate of Zimring's beloved "core
value" of individual penal proportionality there. If, as Zimring sug
gests, individualization is the ideal of the adult as well as the juvenile
court, the adult court is far from accepting it. Consider the defense of
diminished responsibility. When courts are asked to lessen the guilt of
individual sane adults on the grounds that they are (by degrees) less

24. See generally ANTHONY M.
DELINQUENCY (2d ed. 1977) (1969).

PLAIT, THE CmLD

SAVERS:

THE

INVENTION OF

25. P. 169. For instance, juveniles do not have a right to a jury trial because the juvenile
court's mission is "reformative." See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 547 (1971).

26. For instance, the prohibition on double jeopardy and the requirement of proof "be
yond a reasonable doubt" now apply to juvenile proceedings. See Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S.
519 (1975); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
27.

See Feld, supra note 2, at 68-69.

28. See, e.g., David Yellen, The Enduring Difference of Youth, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 995,
997 (1999).
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responsible than others, they overwhelmingly refuse.29 The trend in
adult courts, if anything, is to further lessen the degree to which dif
ferences in individual responsibility can affect punishment.30 This was
further fueled by the retributivist turn in American criminal justice,
which began in the late 1960s.31 Exemplifying the trend, the federal
sentencing guidelines even more greatly reduce the possibility that in
dividual lack of responsibility will be taken into account when deter
mining punishment.32 Even though the sentencing guidelines allow for
some departures, in general the very personal characteristics that con
stitute individual responsibility are not (and perhaps cannot easily be)
taken into account in such a rigid system.33
Zimring acknowledges that the adult court, despite the principle of
penal proportionality, has not been living up to its obligation to take
29. See Sanford H. Kadish, Fifty Years of Criminal Law: An Opinionated Review, 87
CAL.L. REV. 943, 956, 961-962. (1999); see also, e.g., Bethea v. United States, 365 A.2d 64,
87-88 (D.C. 1976) ("The concept of insanity is sintply a device the law employs to define the
outer lintits of that segment of the general population to whom these presumptions con
cerning the capacity for crintinal intent shall not be applied. The line between the sane and
the insane for the purposes of crintinal adjudication is not drawn because for one group the
actual existence of the necessary mental state (or lack thereof) can be determined with any
greater certainty, but rather because those whom the law declares insane are demonstrably
so aberrational in their psychiatric characteristics that we choose to make the assumption
that they are incapable of possessing the specified state of mind. Within the range of indi
viduals who are not 'insane', the law does not recognize the readily demonstrable fact that as
between individual crintinal defendants the nature and development of their mental capa
bilities may vary greatly") (footnote omitted); Commonwealth v.Mazza, 313 N.E.2d 875, 878
(Mass. 1974) ("[T]here is no intermediate stage of partial criminal responsibility between
insanity and ordinary responsibility as defined by statute."). But see People v. Wolff, 394
P. 2d 959 (Cal.1964) (recognizing dintinished responsibility); Henry Weihofen, Partial Insan
ity and Criminal Intent, 24 ILL. L.REV. 505, 508 (1930) (arguing that there is no clear divide
between the sane and insane).
30.

See Kadish, supra note 29, at

979-81.

31. For a critique of this movement, see David Dolinko,
39 UCLA L. REV.1623 (1992).

Three Mistakes of Retriblltiv

ism,

32 See generally Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for
Less Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 901 (1991); Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the
Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J.
1681 (1992). For some strained arguments to the contrary, see S.REP. NO. 98-225, at 52-53
(1983) ("The purpose of the sentencing guidelines is to provide a structure for evaluating the
fairness and appropriateness of the sentence for an individual offender, not to eliminate the
thoughtful intposition of individualized sentences. Indeed, the use of sentencing guidelines
will actually enhance the individualization of sentences as compared to current law."). But
see Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKEFORESTL. REV.223, 257, 272-73 (1993) (char
acterizing these statements as "soothing assurances");Frank O. Bowman, III, The Quality of
Mercy Must Be Restrained, and Other Lessons in Learning to Love the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 1996 WIS. L.REV. 679, 700-701.
33. See David Yellen, What Juvenile Court Abolitionists Can Learn From the Failures of
Sentencing Reform, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 577, 586. Green suggests that the due process and
equal protection arguments for the guidelines also "reflect a desire to strain out ... causal
factors." See Green I, supra note 2, at 2044-45.
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into account the diminished responsibility of young offenders. But his
analysis and recommendations suggest that all this can be disposed of
quite simply. In response to the argument that leaving the matter in
the juvenile court preserves a distinctive (more deterministic) mission,
Zimring protests that there is no "logical reason" why this should be
so. Adult courts can have this focus just as well (p. 174). All that it
takes is for adult criminal courts to realize their true functions - to
calibrate the punishment to fit the individual culpability of the of
fender.
It is hard to fault Zimring for viewing this bifurcated system of
criminal responsibility as creating irrationally strong divides between
what are more slippery concepts. By degree, there are good reasons
to treat young people differently with respect to their criminal culpa
bility and "room to reform" (p. 142). Adults are more capable of
casting off the disadvantages of circumstance and making their own
decisions responsibly. But these are differences of degree rather than
kind. The trick of separating the juvenile court system from the adult
system is to essentialize these gradated differences into paradigms of
the consummately responsible adult and the inevitably irresponsible
youth.34 It is this essentialization to which Zimring objects.
Juvenile justice is not the only example of this essentialization. It
is also the chosen path for dealing with insanity. Rather than recog
nizing that every person experiences differing degrees of mental
health, the insanity defense draws another bright line between the
completely responsible and the wholly irresponsible. It is a line that
even Judge Bazelon, who authored a relatively expansive test for legal
insanity, was willing to concede. His Durham test may have expanded
the class of criminals who could be exonerated for their mental states,
but there continued to be something that looked at least from the out
side like a category of insanity that had conceptual limits. Those who
fit themselves in the category successfully were completely exoner
ated, and those that should have been marginal cases were treated as
wholly culpable.35
Maybe, as a matter of logic, the structure of the criminal law ought
not to have taken such a categorical approach. But there is a reason
for such an approach that must at least be addressed: a free will-based

34. Zimring notes this phenomenon, with complaint, in the context of absolute age bars
to any ascription of criminal capacity, by any court. The problem with these rules, he notes,
is that they treat the matter of capacity as if it were absolute, rather than a matter of degree.
P.75.
35. The Durham test freed the jury to determine if behavior was the product of mental
illness, rather than focusing on the rigid M'Naghten framework. See generally Durham v.
United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954); Symposium, Insanity and the Criminal Law
A Critique o/ Durham v. United States, 22 U. Orr. L. REV. 317 (1955). Judge Bazelon was
concerned to keep a line of defense against the insights of deterministic science and to pre
serve social understandings of responsibility. See Green II, supra note 4, at 170-171.
-
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system, if it is to serve the responsibility-enhancing mission set out for
it, needs to remain somewhat free of corrupting deterministic influ
ences.36 Attempts to give a deterministic view too big a place in adult
systems have typically collapsed, no doubt because of the fear that
giving an inch to those who wish to deny personal responsibility will so
quickly give way to a very troubling mile.37 The Progressive Era jurist
John Wigmore, concerned about the effect of encroaching determinis
tic criminal justice on human responsibility, suggested that such a view
be locked away, "confined to the very limited and feasible field of, say,
juvenile offenses, until it can demonstrate its right to a safe and grad
ual enlargement."38 Insofar as society wishes to recognize the truth of
determinism, it can only do it by placing it in a safe space, far away
from the main criminal justice system.
Similarly, Zimring's suggestion that the goals of retribution and re
form in sentencing can be met within a single sentence, in addition to
being highly implausible,39 fails to appreciate the adult court's need to
send a clear and consistent message about the reality of criminal re
sponsibility. The need to preserve a free will focus in adult criminal
justice is not simply a need to preserve a numerical identity between
the length of sentences actually ordered and the length of sentences
deserved. Rather, the fear that deterministic criminal justice will
erode a sense of personal responsibility is linked to what is perceived
to be the conceptual underpinning behind the criminal law.40 That de
sert and reform can numerically coincide does not entail that they can
coincide ideologically. The message of the criminal law is sent by

36. See supra text

37.

accompanying notes 10-12.

See supra text accompanying notes 9-16.

38. See John H. Wigmore, Comments on Dr. Gosline's Comments, 15 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 5 05, 508 (1924-25), discussed in reen I, supra note 2, at 2028.

�

39. In light of the lessening of sentencing discretion, the "range" of sentencing that
Zimring relies on to provide the framework for reform-based punishment is ever decreasing.
The trend of criminal justice, following the retributivist tum, is to more closely match pun
ishment with desert and lessen the ability ofjudges to deviate for other kinds of reasons. See
supra text accompanying notes 32-33. Further, it is not at all clear that desert-minded people
would be indifferent to where, within the range of allowable punishment, different offenders
would fall. To the extent that there is a range available, the public pays attention to who
gets what within that range. Not all people who commit murder in the first degree must re
ceive the death penalty, but it is a matter of public notice when someone who is seen to de
serve the death penalty does not receive it. See generally Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J.
Keenan, Judges and the Politics ofDeath: Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next
Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REV. 759 (1995) (chronicling public pressures on judges
to impose the death penalty in high-profile cases). Even outside of death penalty issues, the
notion that the public is indifferent to whether certain criminals receive relatively harsh or
light sentences is highly implausible. The contours of "deserved" crime are not as flexible as
Zimring hopes, and the extent that reform can be imposed within them is accordingly 11t
tenuated.
40. See Green I, supra note 2, at 2025-27 (discussing the views of John Wigmore on the
centrality of the principle of deterrence in criminal law).
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more than simply the number of years the criminal is incarcerated.
Zimring cannot hope that a compromise about the number of years in
prison can wash away the true difference between the reform-based
sentence and the retributive sentence.41
Thus, the categories of juvenile and adult justice are considerably
more rigid than Zimring recognizes. The implication of this categori
cal approach for Zimring is that in formulating his recommendations,
he must recognize, in a way his approach fails to, the ultimate central
ity of the battle over the jurisdiction of the juvenile court over certain
young offenders. What is at stake is in the outer definition of a very
crucial category. Those who end up in the juvenile justice system will
inevitably be seen and treated as having less personal responsibility
than those who end up in the adult system. Zimring's collapsing of the
two systems neglects this central truth.
C.

Lessons

The need to keep the adult system pure of the corrupting influ
ences of determinism can be seen by looking to the sorry fate of at
tempts to implement such reforms in the Progressive Era and more re
cently. The reasons for their failure should reinfoi:ce skepticism that
Zimring's approach can be successful.
First, consider the central case of the failure of the Progressive-Era
positivists to take control of the adult court. Zimring's individualized
approach to criminal justice resonates with their reform efforts. Much
like Zimring, the Progressive positivists recognized offenders' incom
plete responsibility for their actions and the corresponding need for
reform-based punishment.
Like Zimring, Progressive reformers
linked lack of responsibility with the need to provide reform-based
punishment. The factors that made individual criminals less than
completely responsible for their crimes also counseled against pun
ishment with a retributive purpose. Justifying the criminal justice sys
tem in terms of reform was a much more appropriate response to
criminal behavior caused by social or individual sicknesses rather than
purely the free choice of the offender. As with Zimring, individualiza
tion was the central characterizing feature of the Progressive agenda,
as it allowed sensitivity to the particular determining social factors that
had led to the offender's commission of the crime as well as the best
strategy for reform.42
·

41. Of course, this opens the possibility that the criminal justice system could publicly
operate as a retributive system, while the specialists within it would secretly make decisions
with reform in mind. Duplicitous though it may seem, this idea has a relatively long lineage.
Green refers to it as "disjunction." See Green II, supra note 4, at 127-29.
42 See ROTHMAN, supra note 6, at 50, 59-60; Green II, supra note 4, at 70-71.
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Zimring may appear to be different from the Progressive reformers
in that much of his argument presupposes some amount of deserved
punishment (pp. 143-44). This does differentiate him from the most
deterministic of the group.43 Most Progressive jurists, though, did con
cede that some notion of desert would continue to play a role, at least
in the guilt-assessment phase of trial, even if they may have wished ul
timately to annihilate all notions of desert from criminal justice.44
They concentrated primarily on the more limited ambitions of bol
stering the availability of excuses at the guilt assessment phase to re
flect an attenuated deterministic vision, and shaping the punishment
phase to completely eliminate free will-based punitiveness.45
Zimring's concession- most likely, for practical reasons - of some
degree of deserved punishment is consistent with the pragmatic ap
proach of most Progressive reformers.
Even Zimring's attempts to press single sentences into the double
duty of satisfying the demands of reform and retribution are not new.
Many positivist thinkers in the Progressive Era attempted to "sell"
their deterministic systems by touting the ways in which the features of
these systems were compatible with what a free will-based system
would require. Reforming criminals, they claimed, could also meet
the social need for retribution. These thinkers asserted that somehow,
in some way (and here they were short on explanation), the threat of
individualized reform could deter future criminality in the same way
as punishment and satisfy a public hungry for vengeance.46
The lesson that Zimring should take from the Progressive-Era re
formers is that, despite their attempts, their ideals never really took
hold in the adult system - it was only in the juvenile system that they
met with any significant degree of success.47 Ideally, for many positiv
ists, the transition between youth and adult criminal justice would
have been as seamless as it is for Zimring.48 Instead, they gained only
a "pocket" of control over the juvenile justice system.

43. Many progressive reformers denied the possibility of any degree of free will·based
responsibility for criminal conduct. See Green II, supra note 4, at 32-42 (discussing, among
others, the psychoanalyst William A. White).
44. See Green II, supra note 4, at 81-102 (discussing John Waite and Alfred Gausewitz).

45.

See Green I, supra note 2, at 1918, 1922-29; Green II, supra note 4, at 28.

46. See Green I, supra note 2, at 2030-31 (discussing William A. White's belief that "his
preferred reform program would meet the requirements of retribution and general deter
rance" and ultimately satisfy society's feelings of "vengeance"); Green II, supra note 4, at 26
("The very unpleasantness of "treatment" would have both specific and general deterrence
effects.").
47. See Green II, supra note 4, at 27, 70-71, 87-88, 93-95.
48. Many Progressive-Era positivists recommended that the adult system be modeled on
the juvenile court. See William A. White, M.D., 13 AB.A. J. 551, 553 (1927).
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Even their success with juvenile justice was by no means complete.
Many juvenile criminals still ended up in "reformatories" whose re
formative purpose was not always readily apparent.49 On the whole,
however, the juvenile justice system was different. It did not function
as a criminal court because its subjects were not seen to possess the
requisite free will.50 Americans were much more comfortable with de
terminism where children were concerned; when it came to adults,
free will still ruled.
Progressive-Era positivists did manage to attain some limited suc
cess in the adult system, but even that has not survived. The Progres
sive's success with adults was somewhat contradictory, involving a split
between the theories behind the guilt-assessment and the sentencing
phases of trial.51 The guilt-assessment phase of the trial has always
presupposed the complete free will of the offender. The "main de
fenses of unfreedom," duress and legal insanity, were (and continue to
be) very narrowly defined.52 Criminals were presumed to have in
tended the natural consequences of their acts, and to have freely
willed those intentions. Progressive-Era sentencing, by contrast, more
fully incorporated positivist ideas - sentences were individualized to
reflect the particular treatment required for rehabilitation. Through
devices like indeterminate sentencing, parole, and probation, Progres
sive reformers attempted to transform criminal punishment into
treatment that could genuinely reform the offender.53

In the adult context, the bulk of these Progressive-Era sentencing
reforms have been effectively reversed. Sentences are anything but
indeterminate and individualized. Some small pockets of reform
mindedness remain, but all in all, retributive sentencing pervades the
modern system.54 The tension embodied by treating adults as free in
the guilt-assessment phase and determined in the sentencing phase
was not able to withstand the passage of time. Especially in light of
the particularly strong social trend towards the taking of greater indi
vidual responsibility, free will won out.
That the failure of the adult court to adopt the Progressive-Era re
forms was due to fears of the influence of deterministic thinking can
be see in the Progressive-Era Chicago Boys' Court, chronicled by

49.

See ROTHMAN, supra note 6, at 43-81.

50. See Michael Willrich, City of Courts: Crime, Law and Social Governance in
Chicago, 1880-1930, at 411-63 (Apr.10, 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
51.

See Green I, supra note 2, at

52

See id.

1925-26.

at 1924.

53. The advantage of these particular devices was that their flexibility allowed adequate
response to the criminal's changing condition: "No one compelled a physician to prescribe
in advance for the patient . . . " ROTHMAN, supra note 6, at 43-44, 59-60.
.

54.

See Kadish, supra note 29, at 978-81.
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Michael Wilhich.55 The Boys' Court took young men who were old
enough to be held responsible as adult criminals, and attempted to
treat them with some of the deterministic tools characteristic of the ju
venile court.56 Although the Boys' Court was itself a separate court, in
some way discrete from the juvenile and adult systems, the boys inside
of it had reached an age where they were considered to be adults, and
the same laws that governed the adult system governed them. Despite
their technical adult status under the criminal law, they still seemed to
many reformers less responsible and more pliable than those in the
adult system.
The Boys' Court demonstrated the problems inherent in attempt
ing to combine the philosophies of the juvenile and adult systems. As
a reform-based system, it was far from ideal because it had to operate
within the framework of the adult criminal law, with the required
adult procedures and adult-length sentences.57 It tried to account for
the age of the young men by incorporating juvenile court techniques.
The court employed psychiatric and sociological specialists,58 and fre
quently used continuances as a means of replicating some of the bene
fits of the indeterminate sentence.59 Even with the genuine desire by
those involved in the movement to treat these boys as reformable ju
veniles,60 the inflexibly free will-based adult law stood in the way.
Rather than being able to calibrate appropriately the adult law to take
account of the diminished responsibility of youth, Boys' Court judges
were forced to resort to ordering that offenders be re-booked on lesser
charges that carried lesser penalties.61 The obstacle of a jury system,
which would no doubt be less sensitive to the enlightened positivist
agenda, had to be avoided through dubiously voluntary waivers on the
part of defendants.62 The adult law, then as now, was not suitable for
the view that its subjects were less than fully responsible for their acts.
What ultimately doomed the Boys' Court was the threat that even
this small amount of deterministic thinking about seemingly adult-like
criminals seemed to pose. Even though the Boys' Court incorporated
enough adult-type features to profoundly disappoint positivistic re
formers,63 the conservatives still accused it of leniency in dealing with

55. See Willrich, supra note 50, at 403.
56. See id. at 420.
57. See id. at 428.
58. See id. at 447-48.
59. See id. at 442-43.
60. See id. at 428-29.
61. See id. at 440-41.
62 See id. at 440.
63. See id. at 461-62.
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serious offenders who, after all, were of age.64 The "contradictions in
herent in the idea of the 'juvenile adult' " were too much for society to
swallow; adults were adults, and they had to be treated with the ap
propriate presumption of free will.65
The effects of deterministic threats to the free will-based system of
adult punishment are also apparent in modern systems of blended ju
risdiction, where young offenders acknowledged to have an adult-like
culpability remain in juvenile court. These systems leave juvenile
cases involving offenders who would otherwise be waived to the adult
court in the juvenile courts, while giving those courts the power to im
pose adult-length sentences on young offenders (pp. 14-15). Zimring
himself notes that the responses to blended jurisdiction have been less
than supportive. Courts asked to enforce adult sentences within a ju
venile framework suffer a "cognitive dissonance" between the com
peting visions of their defendants, the free adult and the determined
child (p. 172). "Twenty year sentences may be socially unavoidable"
as a response, presumably, to a vision of adult-type responsibility for
crime, "but [they] could still be inappropriate for a court that must put
great weight on the interests of juveniles." (p. 169). With blended ju
risdiction, the court must also provide adult procedural protections,
the sort that caused so much trouble for the positivist agenda of the
Boys' Court (p. 170). Because of these rigid structures, it is difficult
for blended jurisdiction to respond to the vision of offenders as juve
niles. The law has decided to treat these offenders as adults, and adult
treatment does not blend well with the philosophy of the juvenile
court.
As with the Boys' Court, even though the blended juvenile court
has largely failed to treat these young offenders under a more deter
ministic philosophy, it is not enough to counter the perceived threat
these systems pose to the adult free �ill presumption. Blended juris
diction is perceived as inadequate to address the social demand for
punishment of those responsible enough to deserve it. The common
sentencing strategy of blended jurisdiction is to provide for adult
length sentences in a youth-driven conditional framework. If the of
fender is not helped by her time in the juvenile system, she will serve
the whole adult sentence; if she is reformed, she will go free at the end
of her minority (pp. 170-71 ). Zimring recognizes that the degree of
determinism inherent in this sort of sentence is precisely why legisla
tures have been reluctant to cede much authority to these kinds of sys
tems. They are not sufficiently punitive or free will-based. Even when
there is a system of blended jurisdiction, the worst youth offenders

64. See id. at 460.
65. Id. at 463.
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end up in adult court anyway (pp. 170-71).66 Society is not comfort
able with the law allowing these adult-type juvenile offenders even a
small degree of juvenile treatment.
These examples show that reform efforts that rely on introducing a
deterministic threat to the adult criminal justice system have consis
tently failed. Thus, Zimring's efforts to reform juvenile justice by de
nying the philosophical divide between the juvenile and adult courts
seem unlikely to succeed, barring some explanation (absent in this
book) of why they should survive the difficulties with bringing the two
approaches together.
D.

Reevaluating the Data

Regardless of the merits of his reform proposals, Zimring's data
about the nature of youth criminality and the court's treatment of it
provide a valuable opportunity to consider precisely how the present
dual juvenile/adult system deals with the conflicts between free will
and determinism. In particular, the criteria for allocating offenders
into each domain are a fruitful source for probing the issue. The pres
ent allocation of young offenders into adult and juvenile courts makes
at least some sense when viewed in the light of the social need to af
firm responsibility while recognizing some degree of determination.
Zimring describes our current situation: our bright line between
juvenile and adult court is presently defined not absolutely by age, but
instead by age plus some consideration of the type of criminality. Cer
tain youth are categorized as adults for the purposes of responsibility
on the basis of the seriousness or frequency of their crimes (p. 74).
Those who end up in adult court are those who have committed very
serious crimes, such as homicide, those with extensive criminal rec
ords, or those on the brink of chronological adulthood (p. 109).
These kids end up in adult court not simply because they happen
to deserve a sentence marginally larger than what the juvenile court
could dole out (Zimring's suggested test).67 They are there because
they are no longer seen as children. As Zimring correctly notes, the
mere fact of committing serious or frequent crimes, endows the of
fender with automatic maturity in the eyes of many in the culture (pp.

66. Even if they remain in juvenile court, they may do so at the cost of transforming the
juvenile court into a exact copy of the free will·based adult system. Zimring notes this effect:
while presently they may be designed for only serious offenses, once blended jurisdiction
systems are installed, "the barrier between aggravated and standard delinquency can be
lowered by increments on a never-ending basis." P. 172. After all, Zimring rightly notes,
"[i]f armed robbers should be subject to the extended penalties and enhanced procedures,
why not all robbers?" P. 172. A free will approach to criminality, once set free in the juve
nile court, threatens to take over entirely.
67. See supra pp. 1989-90.
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144). Zimring also understands the complex function these

transfers serve in the division of criminal justice into separate spheres:

The symbolic value of transfer to criminal courts is that it seems to com
pletely resolve the conflict that many citizens feel when very young ado
lescents are charged with serious acts of violence. The conflict is be
tween the impulse to punish criminals, on the one hand, and to protect
children and youths, on the other. Transfer to adult court resolves this
conflict by declaring the defendant to be no longer a child. [p. 14]
As a rational matter, Zimring is right to criticize this: if placement
in juvenile court is supposed to reflect something about one's degree
of responsibility, this allocation doesn't map on quite right. Immatur
ity can drive one to murder,68 just as it can drive one to commit other
less serious crimes. As Zimring notes, "[t]here are . . . no indications
that violent juveniles are either more or less mature than other youths
of the same age who are arrested" (p. 164). Drawing distinctions
about responsibility based almost entirely on the severity of the crime
committed is, for that reason, irrational.
When viewed in light of the rigidly dualistic system that presently
exists, however, this allocation of offenders makes some sense. Mak
ing what appears to be a de facto categorical exception for homicides
and a few equivalently serious crimes to be inherently adult retains the
bright-line nature of the division between the courts.69 If courts were
to decide, as Zimring recommends, based on each individual's degree
of responsibility and moral desert, the tidy dual system is challenged.
Every offender is both determined, to a degree, and free, to a degree.
The sensitive inquiry as to how much of each this offender is leaves us
with data that makes us uncomfortable in either court. If he falls just
below the responsibility line, he seems too much like an adult to fit
into the juvenile court fiction. If he falls just above, the court knows
the ways in which he is less than free, and finds it harder to justify the
retribution that will be taken against him. But if his special circum
stances are to be taken into account, why not the circumstances of the
eighteen-year-old, or the twenty-year-old, or the forty-five-year-old
with mild mental retardation? Fuzzy lines pose challenges we may not
be prepared to meet. The de facto homicide line, or the repeat of
fender line, provides a workable strategy for avoiding this problem.

68. Zimring gives the example of serious crimes committed by juveniles because of peer
pressure. P. 151 (recounting the story of a juvenile who was taunted by his victim as being
"too chicken" to pull the trigger).
69. Zimring's data show that when prosecutors request waiver in homicide cases, it is
almost always granted. P. 114. In the sample he used, prosecutors only made such a request
in 31 % of cases. This shows that some individualized, rather than categorical, discretion re
mains for prosecutors to decide whether to file for waiver. Once in court, however, it seems
apparent that there is a strong presumption that homicide waiver requests should be
granted.
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Seriousness and frequency of crime also map onto an important
social phenomenon, that of identification. Zimring's data show us that
a fair number of young people commit crimes (even violent ones) in
their youth, and never offend again (p. 84). A fair number of citizens
and legislators can remember (perhaps even fondly) the fights and mi
nor shoplifting of their youth and know for a fact that their failure to
be held fully responsible did not lead to a life of hardened criminality.
Juveniles who stay in juvenile court seem to be more like everyday
people. This reassures us that the threat of treating these youth as de
termined can be contained. By contrast, few of us remember our
youthful homicides, or our years in criminal gangs.
Zimring notes that, in many ways, violent crime is "kid stuff" and
should be treated as a normal phase of human development, rather
than as a pathology (p. 84). Maybe this should be true of homicides as
well as of other types of violent assaults (especially if Zimring is right
that the rise in youth homicide is merely a rise in the availability of
guns, rather than a rise in the brutality of the relevant youth (pp. 3638)) , but it is certainly hard to convince most people of this. Even if a
youth murderer is no more responsible than the schoolyard brawler
we tolerate, perhaps there are reasons to fear that the effect on the of
fender of having taken a human life makes it impossible to return to a
normal life. Our ability to identify the young offender with things that
normal citizens might have done in their youth is a strong determinant
of the category of youth crime.
This phenomenon compares interestingly to the insanity defense,
where identification cuts in the reverse direction. One of the determi
nants of the acceptable boundaries of the insanity category is that the
offender be a person with whom we are not able to identify. If she is
very far out of the bounds of normal human existence, there is less
reason to worry that denying her responsibility will lead to a wholesale
erosion of the idea of free will in everyone else.70 This reversal of
identification in the youth category and the insanity category makes
perfect sense: youth is a common condition that most people have
survived with free will intact. Insanity, by contrast, is pathology. The
category of youth is chosen as reassurance that this condition of irre
sponsibility will go away. Identification here is an advantage. The
category of insanity does quite the opposite. It represents a terrifying
incursion on responsibility that may not be controllable.71 The insanity

70. See Green II, supra note 4, at 186 (quoting Herbert Wechsler, The Criteria of Crimi
nal Responsibility, 22 U. CHI. L. REV.367, 374-75 (1955)).
71. See id. at 18 ("The entire paradigm of responsibility could not withstand the criticism
of scientific positivists once the field of legal insanity was no longer restricted to special and
assertedly rare conditions that were co=only understood to demonstrate a person's total
lack of ability to control his behavior.").
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category must distance these offenders so that their sickness will have
nothing whatsoever to do with normal life.
The way in which offenders are presently allocated into the juve
nile and adult courts supports the idea that the dual court system plays
a role in navigating the tensions between free will and determinism.
The precise contours of waiver decisions reflect a system that is at
tempting to give credit about individual causes of criminality within a
general framework that affirms free will.

ill. CONCLUSION
Zimring's attempts to rationalize our approach to youth criminal
justice neglect the special role of the criminal justice system in affirm
ing free will in the face of the nagging suspicion that much of human
behavior is determined. Because of this important role, courts as
signing personal responsibility can never be as neatly rational and con
sistent as Zimring recommends.

